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Abstract 
 
Hilary Putnam introduced the idea of the threefold relation between mind, 
body and world that it is necessary to take into consideration to adequately 
account for human perception and understanding. Recent philosophical debates 
on aesthetic practices that are characteristic of the present age have paid great 
attention to the fundamental role played by the body in our world-experience 
and, in case of the aesthetics of fashion (as part of the investigation of aesthetic 
experiences that have acquired an extraordinary power and significance in 
today’s widely aestheticized world), also to the essential role played by dress to 
understand the human beings’ particular relation to their own bodies. In this 
article, I first offer a general overview on the often problematic but nevertheless 
intriguing relationship between fashion and philosophy, and on the importance 
of the body/dress relation in the work of some relevant fashion theorists. Then, 
I focus on the contribution of Eugen Fink who inquired into fashion with great 
interest and accuracy, understanding it as a complex and multifaceted 
phenomenon and connecting it to other fundamental topics of investigation like 
the body and play. Finally, I show how these questions, and especially that of 
the central role played by the body in all aspects of our world-experience (where 
the body is understood as both a natural and cultural entity, or even as the 
place in which nature and culture intersect themselves), are also crucial in the 
philosophy of Richard Shusterman, and how the latter’s reflections can be 
fruitfully compared to Fink’s abovementioned phenomenological investigation 
of the significance of clothing and fashion. 
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I.  
In recent debates on aesthetic practices, experiences and 
dimensions that are characteristic of the present age, and that 
have acquired an extraordinary power and significance in 
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shaping our sensus communis aestheticus in today’s widely 
aestheticized world1, one of the main fields that have emerged 
is the aesthetics of fashion. Moving from the pioneering 
contributions on fashion of such thinkers as Simmel, Veblen or 
Benjamin, and also from more recent philosophical-sociological 
writings by such authors as Barthes, Baudrillard, Bourdieu and 
Lipovetsky, several original and important works on this topic 
have appeared in recent times2. This clearly testifies, also with 
regard to fashion, the general need to overcome what Richard 
Shusterman has called “the narrowness of [a certain] dominant 
conception” (Shusterman 2000, 140) in aesthetics and to 
broaden this field beyond the limits of the traditional 
philosophy of fine arts. As has been noted, in order to develop 
an adequate understanding of the present aesthetic situation it 
is important to take into account 
the essential difference between the traditional reference points of 
aesthetics and the reality we effectively experience today. According 
to what we may define the aesthetic common sense, grounded on a 
traditional conception of art, the latter represented a noble and 
refined domain designated to shape people’s taste in certain 
institutional circumstances in which everyday life was somehow 
interrupted or suspended (as it still happens today in museums, art 
galleries, concert halls, theaters, and academies). But the dynamics 
presiding over the shaping and education of taste today are vice 
versa nearly completely coincident with those experienced in our 
“high-aesthetical” everyday lives, namely in the “aestheticized 
reality” that represents the ideal setting for the cultivation and 
diffusion of processes that are primarily embodied by fashion. It is 
not coincidental that the difference between art creations, 
entertainment performances, and fashion events has grown 
increasingly imperceptible as far as both the participants to the 
events, the logic underlying them, the way they take place, and 
finally the institutional settings of these happenings, are concerned 
(Matteucci 2016, 50). 
With regard to fashion, already at the beginning of the 
20th century Georg Simmel had understood and made explicit 
that “the increased power of fashion [had] overstepped the 
bounds of its original domain, which comprised only externals 
of dress”, and had now acquired “an increasing influence over 
taste, theoretical convictions, and even the moral foundations of 
life in their changing forms” (Simmel 1997, 193). About one 
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hundred years later, this has been acknowledged by many other 
theorists. For example, according to Lars F. Svendsen, 
[f]ashion has been one of the most influential phenomena in Western 
civilization since the Renaissance. It has conquered an increasing 
number of modern man’s fields of activity and has become almost 
‘second nature’ to us. So an understanding of fashion ought to 
contribute to an understanding of ourselves and the way we act. […] 
Fashion affects the attitude of most people towards both themselves 
and others, […] and as such it is a phenomenon that ought to be 
central to our attempts to understand ourselves in our historical 
situation […]. [A]n understanding of fashion is necessary in order to 
gain an adequate understanding of the modern world. (Svendsen 
2006, 7, 10) 
However, notwithstanding the great importance for the 
human being of clothing and fashion, there has been until 
recent times a general tendency to ignore them and to neglect 
their intellectual and institutional significance. Indeed, “the 
study of fashion is of recent origin”, and it took quite a long 
time “before fashion became a legitimate research topic for 
scholars, including social scientists” (Kawamura 2005, 6). An 
interest in fashion as a topic arose during the 19th century, but 
even in the 20th century “fashion and/or clothing as a research 
topic have never been popular”: the scholars involved in the field 
of fashion studies often had and still have to face “the academic 
devaluation of fashion as a topic” (Kawamura 2005, 8). 
As noted by Elizabeth Wilson, fashion has been 
“constantly denigrated” and therefore “the serious study of 
fashion has had repeatedly to justify itself”: “all serious books 
about fashion seem invariably to need to return to first 
principles and argue anew for the importance of dress” (Wilson 
2003, 47, 271). If this is true for the field of social and human 
sciences in general, it is even more valid for and appropriate for 
the specific field of philosophy. If we set aside a list of literary 
and essayistic writings of poets and novelists, intellectuals, 
artists or moralists3, and if we limit ourselves to works that can 
be considered as strictly philosophical and undoubtedly 
belonging to the academic domain of philosophy, it becomes 
difficult to avoid the impression of a veritable “philosophic fear 
of fashion” (see Hanson 1993). A philosophical fear, the latter, 
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that is mostly connected to squeamishness about the body as an 
object worthy of intellectual attention (Pappas 2016a, 87n). 
Of course, it is possible to come up with a list of 
philosophers who have provided sometimes only short and 
episodic remarks on fashion but occasionally instead extended 
analyses and systematic observations about it4. However, 
notwithstanding the existence of a minor but interesting 
tradition of philosophical perspectives on fashion, it is difficult 
to deny that, in general, “fashion has been virtually ignored by 
philosophers, possibly because it was thought that this, the 
most superficial of all phenomena, could hardly be a worthy 
object of study for so ‘profound’ a discipline as philosophy”: in 
short, fashion “cannot at any rate be said to be a fashionable 
theme in philosophy”, it has not been “considered a satisfactory 
object of study” (Svendsen 2006, 7, 17). Anyway, as observed by 
Nickolas Pappas, “sooner or later everything comes to interest 
philosophy”; if, on the one hand, “there is a view of the field 
according to which philosophy once encompassed every inquiry 
and went on to lose parts of itself one by one as each field saw 
how to be scientific”, on the other hand there is also a view of 
the field according to which “philosophy’s curiosity continues to 
seize on more of what is said and done and not yet brought into 
philosophy’s consciousness”: if it was “relativity a century ago”, 
perhaps “it’s brain science and film today” (Pappas 2016a, 73) – 
and also fashion, we could add. 
 
2.  
As noted by Elizabeth Wilson, dress “links the biological 
body to the social being, and public to private”, and this “makes 
it uneasy territory”: in fact, 
it forces us to recognize that the human body is more than a 
biological entity, It is an organism in culture, a cultural artefact 
even, and its own boundaries are unclear. […] If the body with its 
open orifices is itself dangerously ambiguous, then dress, which is an 
extension of the body yet not quite part of it, not only links that body 
to the social world, but also more clearly separates the two. Dress is 
the frontier between the self and the not-self. […] In all societies the 
body is ‘dressed’, and everywhere dress and adornment play 
symbolic, communicative and aesthetic roles. Dress is always 
‘unspeakably meaningful’. […] Dress in general seems then to fulfill a 
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number of social, aesthetic and psychological functions; indeed it 
knots them together, and can express all simultaneously. This is true 
of modern as of ancient dress. What is added to dress as we ourselves 
know it in the West is fashion. The growth of the European city in 
the early stages of what is known as mercantile capitalism at the end 
of the Middle Ages saw the birth of fashionable dress, that is of 
something qualitatively new and different. Fashion is dress in which 
the key feature is rapid and continual changing of styles. Fashion, in 
a sense is change, and in modern Western societies no clothes are 
outside fashion (Wilson 2003, 2-3). 
From this point of view, inasmuch as dress immediately 
covers the surface of our body and thus presents it to the world 
as “never naked” but rather “always dressed”, thus 
representing something like a “second skin” (see Entwistle 
2000) for such “second-nature animals”5 as the creatures that 
we are, clothing (and fashion, since the modern age) is clearly 
connected to the bodily dimension of human life. Indeed, 
understanding the phenomenon of clothing even appears as 
indispensable to adequately account for the particular relation 
that human beings normally have with their bodies throughout 
their life. Now, together with some recent developments of 
pragmatism like somaesthetics – the new disciplinary proposal 
introduced by Richard Shusterman and defined as “the critical, 
meliorative study of the experience and use of one’s body as a 
locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation [aisthesis] and creative 
self-fashioning” (Shusterman 2000, 267) –, the philosophical 
tradition that has probably paid the greatest attention to the 
rehabilitation of the embodied constitution of the human world-
experience as such is phenomenology. From Husserl until 
today, investigating the body has represented a major goal of 
inquiry in the phenomenological tradition that has shown the 
body’s “ontological centrality as the focal point from which our 
world and reciprocally ourselves are constructively projected” 
(Shusterman 2000, 270-271)6.  
As has been noted, the “denial of the cognitive 
significance of the body has a long tradition”, stemming from 
Plato and arriving to the present age, inasmuch as “a 
disembodied view on the mind was also found in classical 
cognitive science” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 131). However, 
“an alternative philosophical backdrop” or “alternative 
approach” to the perhaps still prevailing but inadequate 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – XII (1) / 2020 
32 
 
conceptions of the mind/body and mind/world relationships “is 
alive and well”, and has been “worked out in the 
phenomenological views” of various philosophers who 
attempted to “dig deeper into the meaning of embodiment, how 
it situates us and how it shapes our cognitive experience” 
(Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 134). So, in general, according to 
phenomenological investigations of the body, the latter is not 
“one object among others” but rather 
is considered a constitutive or transcendental principle, precisely 
because it is involved in the very possibility of experience. It is deeply 
implicated in our relation to the world, in our relation to others, and 
in our self-relation, and its analysis consequently proves crucial for 
our understanding of the mind-world relation, for our understanding 
of the relation between self and other, and for our understanding of 
the mind-body relation. The phenomenological emphasis on the body 
obviously entails a rejection of Cartesian mind-body dualism. But it 
should be just as obvious that this does not entail an endorsement of 
some kind of Cartesian materialism. It is not as if the 
phenomenological way to “overcome” dualism is by retaining the 
distinction between mind and body, and then simply getting rid of 
the mind. Rather, the notion of embodiment, the notion of an 
embodied mind or a minded body, is meant to replace the ordinary 
notions of mind and body, both of which are derivations and 
abstractions. […] The lived body is neither spirit nor nature, neither 
soul nor body, neither inner nor outer, neither subject nor object. All 
of these contraposed categories are derivations of something more 
basic. […] The body is not a screen between me and the world; rather, 
it shapes our primary way of being-in-the-world. […] Moreover, all of 
[the] aspects of embodiment shape the way I perceive the world. […] 
Since this is the lived body with which I perceive and act, it is in 
constant connection with the world. And this connection is not a mere 
surface-to-surface contact, as a corpse might lie on the surface of a 
table; rather, my body is integrated with the world. To be situated in 
the world means not simply to be located someplace in a physical 
environment, but to be in rapport with circumstances that are bodily 
meaningful (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 135, 137). 
In my view, this can be easily connected to some 
developments in the abovementioned field of somaesthetics, as 
testified for example by Shusterman’s book Body 
Consciousness, where we read: 
The term “soma” indicates a living, feeling, sentient body rather than 
a mere physical body that could be devoid of life and sensation, while 
the “aesthetic” in somaesthetics has the dual role of emphasizing the 
soma’s perceptual role (whose embodied intentionality contradicts 
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the body/mind dichotomy) and its aesthetic uses both in stylizing 
one’s self and in appreciating the aesthetic qualities of other selves 
and things. […] If embodied experience is so formative of our being 
and connection to the world, if (in Husserl’s words) “the Body is […] 
the medium of all perception”, then body consciousness surely 
warrants cultivating, not only to improve its perceptual acuity and 
savor the satisfactions it offers but also to address philosophy’s core 
injunction to “know thyself” […]. The body expresses the ambiguity of 
human being, as both subjective sensibility that experiences the 
world and as an object perceived in that world. A radiating 
subjectivity constituting “the very centre of our experience”, the body 
cannot be properly understood as a mere object; yet, it inevitably also 
functions in our experience as an object of consciousness, even of 
one’s own embodied consciousness. […] I thus both am body and have 
a body. I usually experience my body as the transparent source of my 
perception or action, and not as an object of awareness. It is that 
from which and through which I grasp or manipulate the objects of 
the world on which I am focused, but I do not grasp it as an explicit 
object of consciousness, even if it is sometimes obscurely felt as a 
background condition of perception. But often, especially in 
situations of doubt or difficulty, I also perceive my body as something 
that I have and use rather than am, something I must command to 
perform what I will but that often fails in performance, something 
that distracts, disturbs, or makes me suffer (Shusterman 2008, 1-3). 
3.  
Far from being irrelevant for an aesthetics to fashion, 
what has been said above about the phenomenology of the body 
proves to be very important, because not so many philosophers, 
in general, have addressed fashion as a subject of inquiry, and 
because even among those philosophers who have, not so many 
really took into consideration the body/dress relationship. A 
relationship, the latter, that is of fundamental importance to 
adequately account for both dress as a sort of “second lived 
body” and fashion as an essential aesthetic practice. A relevant 
exception to this mainstream is precisely represented by a 
phenomenologist, and indeed a very important one: Eugen 
Fink, emphatically defined by Husserl himself as “the greatest 
phenomenon of phenomenology” (Husserl, quoted in Moore and 
Turner 2016, 1). In fact, in his 1969 book entitled Mode: ein 
verführerisches Spiel Fink investigated clothing and fashion 
with great interest and accuracy, connecting them to the basic 
anthropological structure of the human being.  
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If Fink’s entire path of thinking can be divided into 
different phases (as argued for example by Simona Bertolini, an 
expert scholar of Fink who has distinguished three steps or 
phases in Fink’s Denkweg) (see Bertolini 2012), then his short 
but remarkable book on fashion from 1969 must be placed in 
the context of the late phenomenological-anthropological 
development of his philosophy, especially focused on play 
(Spiel) and world (Welt)7. As Fink explains in another short but 
fundamental work, Oase des Glücks, “play is not a marginal 
manifestation in the landscape of human life” but it rather 
“belongs essentially to the ontological constitution of human 
existence”: play “is an existentiell”, “a fundamental phenomenon 
of existence, just as primordial and independent as death, love, 
work and ruling”; it is “a phenomenon of existence of an 
entirely enigmatic sort”, “a fundamental possibility of social 
existence”, “an intimate form of human community”, or even 
“the strongest binding power. It is community-founding” (Fink 
2016, 15-16, 18-19, 21-23, 27). For Fink, playing 
is always a confrontation with beings. In the plaything, the whole is 
concentrated in a single thing. Every instance of play is an attempt 
on the part of life, a vital experiment, which experiences in the 
plaything the epitome of resistant beings in general. […] [W]e must 
distinguish between the real human being who “plays” and the 
human role within the instance of play. […] In the enactment of play, 
there remains a knowledge, albeit strongly reduced, about [the 
player’s] double existence. It exists in two spheres […]. This doubling 
belongs to the essence of playing. All the structural aspects touched 
on until now come together in the fundamental concept of the 
playworld. Every sort of playing is the magical production of a 
playworld. […] The playworld is an imaginary dimension, whose 
ontological sense poses an obscure and difficult problem. We play in 
the so-called actual world but we thereby attain (erspielen) a realm, 
an enigmatic field, that is not nothing and yet is nothing actual. […] 
[T]he imaginary character of the playworld cannot be explained as a 
phenomenon of a merely subjective appearance, nor determined to be 
a delusion that exists only within the interiority of a soul but in no 
way is found among and between things in general. The more one 
attempts to reflect on play, the more enigmatic and questionworthy it 
seems to become. […] The relation of the human being to the 
enigmatic appearance of the playworld, to the dimension of the 
imaginary, is ambiguous. […] The greatest questions and problems of 
philosophy are lodged in the most ordinary words and things. The 
concept of appearance is as obscure and unexplored as the concept of 
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Being and both concepts belong together in an opaque, confusing, 
downright labyrinthine way, permeating one another in their 
interplay. […] Play is creative bringing-forth, it is a production. The 
product is the playworld, a sphere of appearance, a field whose 
actuality is obviously not a very settled matter. And nevertheless the 
appearance of the playworld is not simply nothing. […] The 
playworld contains [both] subjective elements of fantasy and 
objective, ontic elements. […] Playing is finite creativity within the 
magical dimension of appearance. […] Human play is (even if we no 
longer know it) the symbolic activity of bringing the sense of the 
world and life to presence (Fink 2016, 23-26, 28-30). 
Fink’s philosophical conception of fashion – that also 
pays great attention to the relevance of the body/dress relation, 
as I said – must be contextualized within his more general 
theory of the central role “played” by play in the whole of the 
human existence. This is confirmed by a few strategic passages 
of Mode: ein verführerisches Spiel, where Fink employs the 
concept of play to explain what fashion really is in its very 
“essence”, i.e. also from an ontological point of view concerning 
the Seinsrang or Seinssinn of this phenomenon. Inasmuch as it 
belongs to the sphere of play that, in turn, is part of what Fink 
calls “the decisive fundamental phenomena of human 
existence”, fashion proves to be extremely useful also from a 
philosophical point of view. Indeed, fashion proves to be a 
phenomenon that can allow us to better grasp some of the 
significant aspects of human existence already emphasized by 
Fink with regard to play, such as the status of appearances, the 
relevance of appearances for the life of a community or society 
(and hence also the question of so-called social appearances8), 
and the complex, polysemous, multidimensional and 
fundamentally ambiguous relation of the human being to 
his/her body and the world. 
 
4.  
Starting from the question concerning the particular 
nature of the human being, in his book on the aesthetics of 
fashion Fink significantly defines the human being as “a 
player”9; as a peculiar, odd animal that unites in itself nature 
and freedom, impulse and rationality; as “a curious creature” 
that “is condemned to self-organization and self-formation”10. It 
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is in this context that the fundamental significance of play for 
the human being (and, arising from this, the “playful” character 
of fashion itself) emerges. Fink is quite explicit on this point, 
and in fact he says that fashion relies on “the free play-impulse 
of the human being”: for him, “fashion belongs to the realm of 
freedom and play” and, from this point of view, developing an 
adequate understanding of what fashion actually is represents 
“a cultural-pedagogical task of the first rank, in order to gain a 
self-comprehension of the human being as a player” (Fink 1969, 
90, 96, 113). This also leads Fink to understand fashion as 
belonging to the dimension of sociability and free time or 
leisure: a question, the latter, to which he dedicates many 
pages and remarks in his book11. 
What is remarkable in Fink’s investigation of fashion is 
also his capacity to provide a non-reductionist approach: 
namely, an approach that is able to avoid the reduction of such 
a complex phenomenon to a single and supposedly simple 
principle, aspect or element, and even to recognize fashion as a 
human activity whose antinomical essence, so to speak, consists 
in being one thing and at the same time the opposite. This 
makes it possible, for example, to explicitly compare his 
phenomenological approach to fashion to Georg Simmel’s 
understanding of fashion as grounded at one and the same time 
on the twofold drive toward imitation and differentiation (both 
individual and collective), or even as peculiarly suspended or 
oscillating between being and not-being. For Simmel, fashion 
possesses the peculiar attraction of limitation, the attraction of a 
simultaneous beginning and end, the charm of newness and 
simultaneously of transitoriness. […] Fashion is […] imitation of a 
given pattern and thus satisfies the need for social adaptation; it 
leads the individual onto the path that everyone travels, it furnishes 
a general condition that resolves the conduct of every individual into 
a mere example. At the same time, and to no less a degree, it satisfies 
the need for distinction, the tendency towards differentiation, change 
and individual contrast. […] Hence fashion is nothing more than a 
particular instance among the many forms of life by the aid of which 
we seek to combine in a unified act the tendency towards social 
equalization with the desire for individual differentiation and 
variation. […] Connection and differentiation are the two fundamental 
functions which are here inseparably united, of which one of the two, 
although or because it forms a logical contrast to the other, becomes 
the condition of its realization (Simmel 1997, 188-192). 
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With regard to the question of the unique character of 
the human being, Fink stresses the latter’s particular 
relationship to its body and, connected to this, the central role 
played by dress precisely in its relationship to the body12 
(including, among other things, the fashion/sexuality 
relationship)13. In doing so, i.e. in claiming that our existence is 
constitutively embodied, that we are world-open in an embodied 
way, that reality is bodily disclosed to us, and that the human 
body is not a thing but is rather the human being’s effective 
reality, Fink clearly relies on insights into the dual dimension 
of our bodily life – namely, into the dual way we can refer to our 
own body both as Körper (an objective body, i.e. a mere object, a 
thing among things examined from a third-person perspective) 
and as Leib (a lived body, the body of a living organism 
experienced from a first-person perspective) – that have 
characterized to a great extent the development of 
phenomenological philosophy. An insight, the latter, that has 
also been paid great attention to by Richard Shusterman in the 
context of his latest developments of somaesthetics, for example 
when he claims that, 
if somaesthetics has introduced the term “soma” to distinguish the 
living, sentient, purposive human body from the lifeless bodies of 
corpses and all sorts of inanimate objects that are bodies in the 
general physical sense, this does not preclude the term from having 
its own rich ambiguity. Embracing both the mental and the physical, 
the soma is both subject and object. It is the bodily, sensory 
subjectivity through which we perceive things, including the soma 
itself as a bodily object in the world. It thus straddles both sides of 
the German phenomenological distinction between Leib (felt bodily 
subjectivity) and Körper (physical body as object in the world). If 
Helmut Plessner described the self as being a Leib while having its 
body as object (Leibsein and Körperhaben), then somaesthetics takes 
its task as understanding and cultivating the soma as both 
perceiving subject and expressive object, as being both what it is and 
ineluctably has. […] Besides its complexity as both subject and object 
in the world, the soma embraces other ambiguities. It exemplifies the 
ambiguity of human existence as both shared species-being and 
individual difference. Philosophers have emphasized rationality and 
language as the distinguishing essence of humankind. But human 
embodiment seems just as universal and essential a condition of 
humanity. […] The soma reveals that human nature is always more 
than merely natural but instead deeply shaped by culture 
(Shusterman 2019, 14-15). 
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Once again, far from being irrelevant for the specific 
purposes of a philosophical inquiry into fashion, the 
phenomenological conception of Körper and Leib rather proves 
to be essential, inasmuch as it also opens up the possibility of a 
general rethinking of the body/dress relationship (“Verhältnis 
von Kleid und Leib”, in Fink’s own words) (Fink 1969, 102). In 
fact, clothes serve as a cover, as a protection for the human 
being, but also (if not in the first place) as a proximate, “close-
to-the-body” means of expression (see Fink 1969, 50). What 
emerges is thus a concept of dress, and in particular of 
fashionable dress, as a sort of “second lived body (zweiter Leib)” 
(Fink 1969, 69) for such particular “second-nature animals” as 
the human beings that, following again John McDowell (and a 
long tradition of philosophical-anthropological theories that his 
insights rely on), are not merely embedded in a natural 
environment (Umwelt) like all other animals but are rather 
characterized by the possession of a “second nature” and thus 
live in a historical-cultural world (Welt)14. 
Quite interestingly, somehow analogous observations on 
body and dress have been made by such influencing fashion 
theorists as Joanne Entwistle and Malcom Barnard (without 
ever mentioning Fink, however). The former, in her influential 
study The Fashioned Body, also speaks of dress as a sort of 
extension of our embodied Self, i.e. as a sort of “second skin” 
(see Entwistle 2000)15. While Barnard, for his part, explicitly 
refers to Entwistle herself and still other theorists, and argues 
that fashion is “about the ‘fashioned’ body”, by which he 
understands “not a natural […] body” but rather 
a “produced” and therefore “cultured” body. This is partly because 
one of the meanings of fashion (as a verb) is “to make” or “to 
produce”, and partly because there can be no simple, uncultured, 
natural body. […] Even when naked, the body is posed or held in 
certain ways, it makes gestures and it is thoroughly meaningful. To 
say that the fashioned body is always a cultured body is also to say 
that the fashioned body is a meaningful body […]. This is because 
saying that fashion is meaningful is to say that fashion is a cultural 
phenomenon (Barnard 2007, 4; my emphasis). 
In this context, returning to Fink, a decisive element in 
his conception is represented by the human capacity to assume 
a distanced position from natural impulses (especially those 
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concerning natural attraction and seduction), to learn how to 
manage and control them, to establish a mediated relationship 
with them rather than immediately attempting to satisfy them, 
and finally to sublimate such impulses by means of cultural 
activities. It is precisely at this point that fashion comes into 
play, inasmuch as the latter is understood by Fink as a 
seductive game, as a “sphere-in-between” or a “field-in-
between”: namely, as a space that is the result of a typically 
human process of sublimation of impulses but does not 
function as a means for the latter’s mere repression or 
suppression, but rather leads to their intensification and even 
exaggeration, although always in the context of culturally 
domesticated activities. 
From this point of view, fashion’s relation to natural 
impulses and seduction is not immediate and one-sided, but 
rather complex and also ambiguous, as if fashion played with 
them and at the same time was played by them, in an 
inextricable intertwinement of activity and passivity16. In more 
general terms, in Fink’s perspective fashion seems to share 
with human existence as such a fundamental ambiguity17: or 
better, fashion embodies the ambiguous character that is 
typical of the human being as both a natural and a cultural 
being, it takes this ambiguity on, and it actually brings it to 
extremes. For Fink, “the phenomenon of fashion is connected to 
change, instability, fleetingness” (Fink 1969, 32), and this may 
be understood as a reflection, as it were, of the unstable, 
uncertain, always transient character of human nature as such 
(see, in particular, Fink 1969, 111-113). 
 
5. 
It is clear that making fashion’s essentially ambiguous 
and multiform character fully explicit implies a refusal to adopt 
a simplifying or reductionist approach to this phenomenon, and 
thus leads one to ask the question as to whether or not there is 
a particular aspect or dimension of fashion that may be taken 
as a privileged key to gain an adequate access to it. Fink’s 
answer to this question is that such a privileged key is 
represented by the aesthetic dimension: that is, should one 
want to assign fashion to a particular domain within the broad 
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and complex realm of various philosophical disciplines 
(ontology, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, politics, 
metaphysics, etc.), it would be definitely aesthetics. 
Quite interestingly, this is also something that several 
fashion theorists have paid great attention to. To quote again 
Elizabeth Wilson, what is required in order to adequately 
account for fashion is “an explanation in aesthetic terms”: for 
Wilson, fashion is “a branch of aesthetics”, it is “one among 
many forms of aesthetic creativity which make possible the 
exploration of alternatives”, in short it is “a serious aesthetic 
medium” (Wilson 2003, 116, 245, 268). Indeed, one of the main 
reasons why fashion greatly conditions our lives and even 
contributes to the definition of the Zeitgeist of the present age, 
probably lies in its aesthetic potentialities. For example, it lies 
in the capacity of fashion to express, through aesthetic means, 
symbolic contents that come to play a relevant role in the 
definition of both our individual and collective identities. As 
further observed by Wilson, fashion represents “an aesthetic 
medium for the expression of ideas, desires and beliefs 
circulating in society”: for her, “everywhere dress and 
adornment play symbolic, communicative and aesthetic roles”, 
and she adds that in various cases the theorists’ attempts to 
reduce fashion to psychology or sociology have led us to exclude, 
“or at best minimise, the vital aesthetic element of fashion” 
(Wilson 2003, 3, 9). 
In Fink’s essay Mode: ein verführerisches Spiel the idea 
of a “peculiar aesthetic function of fashion” (Fink 1969, 70) 
emerges, for example, in connection to the question of 
leadership or command in fashion. A question, the latter, that 
Fink proposes to solve, as it were, by introducing the concept of 
seduction as quintessential to understand what fashion really is 
and how it functions (see Fink 1969, 96-101). In fact, for Fink 
fashion’s influence on us, its capacity to determine our taste 
and preferences, often extending its conditioning power to our 
lifestyle and our decisions in other dimensions of our life, does 
not derive from some kind of command or authoritative 
coercion. Rather, it is the result of fashion’s persuasive power 
deriving from its incomparable ability to play with seduction, 
with the human being’s fundamental need to fascinate and at 
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the same time be fascinated or seduced. This persuasion and 
seduction power is precisely exercised by fashion with aesthetic 
means, i.e. thanks to its capacity to play in always new ways 
with forms and contents, materials and colors, in order to 
produce original works that may fascinate us and may be 
aesthetically appreciated and enjoyed by us. On this basis, Fink 
strategically makes use of such important concepts of aesthetics 
as Schein, Verklärung, Phantasie or Illusion, and eventually 
draws the conclusion that fashion’s essential way of being, i.e. 
what it really is, is precisely “a seductive play” and “a seductive 
appearance” (Fink 1969, 101). 
 
6. 
It is quite intriguing to see how many of the questions 
and aspects that have emerged from Fink’s phenomenological 
treatment of the body/dress relation and the idea of clothes as a 
sort of “second skin” for the “second-nature animals” that we 
are, can be fruitfully compared to some recent somaesthetic 
observations on body, dress and fashion from the pragmatist 
philosopher Richard Shusterman. As already observed before, 
the concept of “soma” introduced precisely by somaesthetics 
refers to “the living, sentient, purposive human body” and is 
aimed to embrace “both the mental and the physical”, and also 
both the natural and the cultural in their complex mutual 
intertwinement, thus including “both sides of the German 
phenomenological distinction between Leib […] and Körper”: as 
Shusterman explains, “the soma reveals that human nature is 
always more than merely natural but instead deeply shaped by 
culture” (Shusterman 2019, 14-15). Now, it is clear that the 
cultural nature (so to speak) of the human body’s relation to the 
world does not depend only on the fact that, as Elizabeth 
Wilson claims, “in all societies the body is ‘dressed’, and 
everywhere dress and adornment play symbolic, communicative 
and aesthetic roles” (Wilson 2003, 2). However, it is also clear 
that clothing, inasmuch as it is such a universal and thus 
fundamental-anthropological phenomenon, plays a great role in 
this process. This evidently makes it an interesting object for 
inquiry for such a philosophical discipline as somaesthetics, 
with its aim to favor 
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[a] critical study and meliorative cultivation of the experience and 
use of the living body (or soma) as a site of sensory appreciation 
(aesthesis) and creative self-stylization. An ameliorative discipline of 
both theory and practice, somaesthetics seeks to enrich not only our 
discursive knowledge of the body but also our lived somatic 
experience and performance; it aims to improve the meaning, 
understanding, efficacy, and beauty of our movements and of the 
environments to which our actions contribute and from which they 
also derive their energies and significance. To pursue these aims, 
somaesthetics is concerned with a wide diversity of knowledge forms, 
discourses, social practices and institutions, cultural traditions and 
values, and bodily disciplines that structure (or could improve) such 
somatic understanding and cultivation” and its internal division in 
branches (Shusterman 2016, 101). 
From the point of view of somaesthetics – which is “an 
interdisciplinary project, in which theory and practice are 
closely connected and reciprocally nourish each other” 
(Shusterman 2016, 101) – clothing and fashion especially 
appear as interesting objects of inquiry because of their 
essentially ambiguous character. This can be clearly and 
explicitly connected to some of Fink’s abovementioned 
observations on the same topic. In fact, if the human body’s 
intrinsic dialectic of Leibsein and Körperhaben “expresses the 
ambiguity of human being” (Shusterman 2008, 1), in an 
analogous way also “the notion of fashion embraces 
considerable ambiguity” (Shusterman 2016, 95). Fashion – 
understood by Shusterman as “a complex, paradoxical 
enterprise of trying to reconcile contrasting elements into a 
compelling fit”, and as “a complex process of fitting a striking 
variety of conflicting forces together in a productive and 
dynamic balance” – is surely “a social and cultural product” 
(Shusterman 2016, 92, 95, 98). At the same time, however, 
especially because of its relation to the fundamental human 
phenomenon of clothing, fashion “appears to derive from the 
deeper physiological and psychological essence of human 
nature”, i.e. it is “‘by nature’ artificial” (Shusterman 2016, 98) 
like the human being. This, once again, clearly reminds us of 
some of the abovementioned observations on fashion offered by 
Fink from a phenomenological perspective that can be fruitfully 
compared to Shusterman’s recent somaesthetic developments of 
this topic. According to him, 
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fashion paradoxically reveals the body it conceals precisely by 
concealing it. […] Though clothing is not strictly speaking part of 
one’s body in the way that a tattoo belongs to it, our bodies shape our 
clothes in ways that they do not shape more external fashion 
accessories. […] [O]ur clothes shape our bodies. […] We need also to 
consider the ways our clothing shapes our somatic habits, because 
the purposive body is not simply a bundle of bones and flesh but a 
complex of postural and behavioral dispositions that guide our 
actions without our needing to think about them explicitly. […] 
[C]lothes also have a social meaning as they are associated with 
certain attitudes that wearers of those clothes spontaneously adopt 
through prior experience in wearing those clothes. […] As clothes are 
made to fit the bodies and movements of men and women, so the 
bodily behavior of those men and women are conversely made 
(through training or implicit learning) to fit the meanings of those 
clothes (Shusterman 2016, 98-99). 
As Shusterman claims, “a vast and complex array of 
pragmatic disciplines has been designed to improve our 
experience and use of our bodies”, and this includes “forms of 
grooming and decoration, martial and erotic arts, yoga, 
massage, aerobics, bodybuilding, calisthenics, and modern 
psychosomatic disciplines” (Shusterman 2016, 102), and also 
clothing and fashion. If it is true that “our bodies are visible 
social markers of our values, affiliations, and tastes”, then we 
can say that it is also through the particular kind of “somatic 
self-stylization” (Shusterman 2016, 103) provided by fashion (in 
its being an unceasing play with forms, colors and seductive 
appearances) that individuals, in the present age of widespread 
aestheticization, have the chance to develop their unique 
“somatic styles” (Shusterman 2011). Returning once more to the 
question of play, our goal should thus be that of becoming 
acquainted with fashion, of freely, actively and even joyfully 
playing with it (instead than being passively played by it, i.e. 
conditioned and even determined by its often incomprehensible 
and unbearable caprices), of autonomously developing our own 
“somatic style”, and of individually finding the right connection 
between our own Leib and the “second lived body” that, as we 
have seen, is dress. 
 
 
NOTES 
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1 For a reconstruction and interpretation of current debates on 
aestheticization (sometimes also viewed as the aesthetic counterpart of 
globalization), see for instance: Michaud 2003, Lipovetsky and Serroy 2013, 
Di Stefano 2017, Matteucci 2017, Mecacci 2017, Iannilli 2018. 
2 Recent and relevant philosophical works on fashion include, for example, for 
instance, the books and collections by Scapp and Seitz 2010; Wolfendale and 
Kennett 2011; Matteucci and Marino 2016; Pappas 2016b. 
3 An excellent reconstruction and interpretation, that also takes into 
examination earlier literary and essayistic studies on fashion before the 19th 
century, can be found in Esposito (2004, especially 7-16, 34-42, 65-73). 
4 On this topic, let me remind the reader of Marino 2016. 
5 I freely adapt here to my purposes the important concept of “second nature” 
employed by John McDowell in his famous epistemological work Mind and 
World (1996), which can be also connected to a long and influential tradition 
of phenomenological, hermeneutical and philosophical-anthropological 
reflections on human nature in 19th- and 20th-century German thought (on 
this topic, see Marino 2015, chapter 1).   
6 To be precise, Shusterman refers here to Merleau-Ponty that he also 
emphatically defines in subsequent writings as “something like the patron saint 
of the body […] in the field of Western philosophy” (Shusterman 2008, 49). 
7 According to Simona Bertolini, “the notion of world is the key concept of 
Fink’s entire post-war philosophical work. […] The concept of world-totality is 
the veritable barycentre of Fink’s philosophy” (Bertolini 2012, 128, 242). In 
turn, for Bertolini, Fink’s idea of “cosmological difference”, clearly deriving 
from the concept of kosmos (expressed in German with such words as Welt, 
Weltganzheit, Weltsein), reminds of Heidegger’s famous idea of the 
“ontological difference” between Being and beings but does not fully 
correspond to it. 
8 On this topic, see for example Carnevali 2020. 
9 “The human being – as a player – is close to fashion and all its phenomenical 
forms” (Fink 1969, 40). 
10 See also the insights and explanations on this aspect provided at pages 22-
23, 53, 64 of Fink’s book. 
11 On the general significance of sociability for human life, in general, and 
its connection to the domain of play, in particular, see Fink 1969, 79-81, 85-
86, 88, 93. 
12 For Fink, “the human body always already shows, reveals […] and permeates 
at the same time clothing with its tendency to communication. […] Fashion is a 
phenomenon that is essentially connected […] to the human being’s embodied 
nature, to our existence’s being-incarnated” (Fink 1969, 50, 77). 
13 On this aspect, see Fink 1969, 51-53, 69, 71. 
14 On this topic, let me remind the reader of Marino 2017. 
15 It is probably not by chance that Entwistle’s original account relies, among 
others, also on phenomenological insights into the significance of the bodily 
dimension for the constitution of our experience of the world in general. 
16 More in general, the complexity and, as it were, the eminently dialectical 
character of Fink’s conception of fashion (using here the concepts of 
“dialectics” and “dialectical” with a broad and quite general meaning) emerges 
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in the perhaps clearest way when Fink introduces the idea of an intrinsic 
relation between opposite moments, antagonisms and contrasts as relevant 
and indeed decisive for the definition of fashion: for example, struggle for 
eternity vs. transience, naturalness vs. artificialness, imitation vs. distinction, 
conformism vs. originality, assimilation to others vs. individualism, public life 
vs. private life, dressing vs. undressing (see Fink 1969, 33, 45-46, 62, 69-70, 
105). On a terminological level, this aspect especially emerges in the use of 
such concepts as Gegenwirkung, Gegenwendigkeit or Gegensatzmotiv (see 
Fink 1969, 30, 53, 96-97). 
17 “Dress has an ambivalent, equivocal and plurivalent expressive value” 
(Fink 1969, 36). Fashionable dress is characterized by its “ambivalence, its 
ambiguity and its intrinsic oppositive character” (Fink 1969, 55). “Fashion 
has many faces, its smiling gracefulness is more enigmatic than the smile of 
the Gioconda” (Fink 1969, 77). 
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